Desktop saved sign-ins
OwnBase encrypts the desktop app's saved sign-ins using Electron's
OS-backed safeStorage.
Windows uses the current OS account's protection; macOS uses Keychain and Linux
needs a supported secret store. Linux's basic_text fallback is refused. On
macOS, consistent application signing is needed for reliable Keychain behavior
across updates. The alpha's Mac app is signed ad hoc, and each build's signature
differs, so after an update macOS may ask for your password before OwnBase can
read its saved sign-ins; choose Always Allow. Declining only means signing in
again, as described below.
An old plaintext sign-in list is migrated on its next successful read or settings write. The original remains intact if encryption or replacement fails; it is still plaintext until migration succeeds. New credentials are never saved with a plaintext fallback. A failed save leaves the current session usable and shows Retry saving. Unlock the system key store and retry before closing if you want the new sign-in remembered.
If saved sign-ins cannot be unlocked, the app offers Retry or a confirmed Forget saved sign-ins action. Forgetting removes only the saved sign-ins, so you can authenticate again while keeping drafts, queued messages and hosted workspaces. Copying desktop settings to another OS account/machine may require signing in again; the protected credentials depend on the original OS key store. Older desktop builds do not understand this protected saved-sign-in format.
Drafts and other local settings remain unencrypted. This does not encrypt browser localStorage, server data or older backups, and it does not protect credentials from a compromised running app or another process with the same OS-account access. Native runtime verification currently covers Windows; macOS/Linux behavior still needs platform testing.